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RESTITUTIONARY RIGHTS OF A VENDEE IN DEFAULT
OF AN ORAL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF LAND
It is almost a universal rule that a plaintiff vendee in default of
an oral contract to purchase realty cannot recover his down payment
if the defendant vendor is himself innocent of any breach and is
willing and able to convey.1 The problem is not without some diffi-
culty, however, for two fundamental and divergent legal policies
are relevant to its analysis. To allow restitution to the defaulting
buyer would permit him to terminate performance at his will and
recover payments from a seller who has bargained for full perform-
ance. Yet, to deny restitution may be to bestow a windfall upon the
seller, for the payments retained may be greater in value than his
actual injury, thus imposing a penalty or forfeiture upon the buyer.2
The Restatement of Restitution provides that in order to be
entitled to restitution the plaintiff must show that he has conferred
a benefit upon the defendant, and that the retention of that benefit
is unjust.3 Although the cases rarely use the Restatement vocabu-
lary,4 for purposes of analysis it is believed that the problem should
be discussed in terms of the unjustness of the defendant's retention of
the down payment.5 There are situations where the seller's retention
of the buyer's payment could be considered unjust; there are other
situations where the seller's retention is wholly justifiable. This
note will endeavor to distinguish these situations while discussing
the rationale and application of the rule that disallows restitution.
Special emphasis will be given to California law.
Substance of the Rule Denying Restitution
Effect of ihe Staiute of Frauds
There is little uniformity in the wording of the Statute of Frauds
in the various states.6 Some provide that "no action shall be
brought"7 on oral contracts within their scope; others proclaim the
1 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 538, at 844 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1960) [here-
inafter cited as WILLISTON]; 2 A. ConBiN, CONTRACTS § 332, at 177 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as CoRBIN]; Annot., 169 A.L.R. 187 (1947).
2 Cf. 5 S. WILLISTON & G. THomPSoN, CONTRACTS § 1473, at 4118 (Rev. ed.
1937).
3 RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
4 For a case speaking in terms of an unjust retention, see Laham v.
Reimann, 177 Ore. 193, 198, 160 P.2d 318, 320 (1945), where it is said: "In
order for plaintiffs to prevail in this action, which is for money had and re-
ceived, they must prove that defendant has received money which in equity
and good conscience belongs to them." See also Arjay Investment Co. v.
Kohhmetz, 9 Wis. 2d 535, 101 N.W.2d 700 (1960).
5 See Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: What Consti-
tutes an Unjust Retention, 48 AIcH. L. REV. 923 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
Jeanblanc].
6 3 WILLISTON § 526. Section 526A of Williston's treatise contains a
table indicating the wording of the Statute in some states.
7 E.g., MASS. GEN. Lsws ANN. ch. 259, § 1 (1959).
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enumerated oral contracts "void '8 or "invalid."9 The wording of the
Statute has sometimes been determinative of the defaulting buyer's
right to restitution,0 notwithstanding the provision in the Restate-
ment of Contracts that the wording of the Statute should not deter-
mine these rights.'" Thus, in a few states where the Statute makes
oral contracts within its scope "void," recovery is allowed by giving
substantive effect to the Statute. 2 It is reasoned that a void con-
tract is a complete nullity, and concluded that a null and void
promise can furnish no consideration to the buyer.18 As stated by
the Wisconsin Supreme Court:
The purchaser can derive no benefit from the supposed contract.
Nothing passes to him by virtue of it; he obtains no interest in the
land, and no promise or agreement on the part of the seller to convey
him any; and he can never derive any advantage from what has
transpired, except it be as a matter of favor on the seller's part.14
Since the law is said to imply a promise of repayment where money
is paid without consideration so long as no rule of public policy or
good morals is violated,1 recovery is allowed.
The great majority of courts refuse to give such substantive ef-
fect to the Statute. 6 The contract, it is argued, is not illegal,17 there
is no objection to complete performance, 8 nor is there any lack of
consideration despite the buyer's inability to enforce the seller's
promise in an action on the contract. 9 The Supreme Court of Maine
8 E.g., Wis. STATS. ANN. ch. 240, § 240.08 (1957).
9 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624.
10 See generally Jeanblanc 933-46.
11 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 355, comment c (1932).
12 Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1, 242 N.W. 592 (1932), aff'd on rehearing, 61
S.D. 54, 245 N.W. 908 (1932); Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418 (1873); Fields v.
Korn, 366 Mich. 108, 113 N.W.2d 860 (1962); Durkin v. Machesky, 177 Wis.
595, 188 N.W. 97 (1922); Arjay Investment Co. v. Kohlmetz, 9 Wis. 2d 535, 101
N.W.2d 700 (1960); Brown v. Pollard, 89 Va. 696, 17 S.E. 6 (1893); Nelson v.
Shelby Mfg. & Improvement Co., 96 Ala. 515, 11 So. 695 (1892).
13 Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1, 6-7, 242 N.W. 592, 594 (1932); Brown v.
Pollard, 89 Va. 696, 702, 17 S.E. 6, 8 (1893); Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418, 420
(1873); Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142, 155 (1860).
14 Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142, 155 (1860). It seems, however, that
this reasoning could also be used in jurisdictions where the contract is made
"voidable" only, for no matter how the Statute is worded, the buyer cannot
enforce the seller's promise. Professor Corbin has concluded that social policy
considerations, rather than mere statutory interpretation, were the motivating
factors for these decisions. 2 CoR= § 334, at 183-84. See also 3 WI.LISTON
§ 538, at 845 n.12.
'5 Arjay Investment Co. v. Kohlmetz, 9 Wis. 2d 535, 538, 101 N.W.2d 700,
702 (1960); Durkin v. Machesky, 177 Wis. 595, 602, 188 N.W. 97, 100 (1922).
16 Grauel v. Rohe, 185 Md. 121, 124, 43 A.2d 201, 203 (1945). See also
cases cited notes 17-19 infra. For a discussion of the difference between the
jurisdictions which give substantive effect to the Statute and those that do
not, see Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1, 242 N.W. 592 (1932).
17 Keystone Hardware Corp. v. Tague, 246 N.Y. 79, 83, 158 N.E. 27, 28
(1927); Lanham v. Reimann, 177 Ore. 193, 197, 160 P.2d 318, 319 (1945); Grauel
v. Rohe, 185 Md. 121, 124, 43 A.2d 201, 204 (1945); Sennett v. Shehan, 27 Minn.
328, 329, 7 N.W. 266 (1880).
1s Cases cited note 17 supra.
10 Phelan v. Carey, 222 Minn. 1, 7-8, 23 N.W.2d 10, 14 (1946); Garbarino v.
Union Say. & Loan Ass'n, 107 Colo. 140, 147, 109 P.2d 638, 642 (1941); Day v.
Wilson, 83 Ind. 463, 464 (1882); Mitchell v. McNab, 1 Ill. App. 297, 301 (1878).
MVay 19681
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
has stated the proposition as follows:
[T]he contract, though within the statute of frauds, is not utterly
void; and, notwithstanding it cannot be enforced at law, is morally
binding, and for the purposes of justice and equity, may, in certain
cases, be upheld.20
It has been argued that to deny recovery to the defaulting
buyer is to enforce the contract against him,21 for the cases that
deny restitution allow the seller to introduce into evidence both the
oral contract and the plaintiff's breach as a defense to the plaintiff's
suit.22  This argument fails to recognize the true theory of the
buyer's claim. He is not suing upon the contract which he has re-
pudiated; he is suing for restitution on the ground that the seller
is unjustly retaining a benefit conferred upon him by the buyer.
The buyer seeks to prove that the seller's retention of the down pay-
ment is unjust. Therefore, the seller, by way of defense, must be
allowed to disprove the claimed unjustness of his retention,23 and
the oral contract and the buyer's breach may best suit this pur-
pose. 24 The plaintiff-in-default situation can be compared with the
situation where an innocent buyer sues a seller in default for resti-
tution following the seller's breach of an oral contract within the
Statute of Frauds. In that situation recovery is almost universally
allowed,25 there being no suggestion that the contract is being en-
forced against the seller.26  If evidence of the oral contract and the
breach were inadmissible, recovery could be denied on the ground
20 Gammon v. Butler, 48 Me. 344, 345 (1861).
21 King v. Welcome, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 41 (1855). In King, a defaulting
plaintiff brought suit in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services
he performed under an oral contract within the Statute of Frauds. The court
held that the defendant could not set up the oral contract and the plaintiff's
breach as a defense because that would be indirectly enforcing the contract
against the plaintiff. Yet, in the same jurisdiction a few years earlier, re-
covery of a down payment was denied a defaulting vendee under an oral con-
tract for the sale of land. Coughlin v. Knowles, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 57 (1843).
There is no rational basis upon which the two cases can be distinguished.
See 2 CoarN § 334, at 183-84 n.78; F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACT § 98, at
155 n.2 (1913).
22 See e.g., Roberts v. Roesch, 306 Pa. 435, 159 A. 870 (1932); Grauel v.
Rohe, 185 Md. 121, 43 A.2d 201 (1945); 3 WILUSTON § 538, at 842.
23 2 CoRBIN § 332, at 177; 3 WM.STON § 538, at 843; Jeanblanc 934-38.
See generally Williams, Availability By Way of Defense Contracts Not Com-
plying With the Statute of Frauds, 50 L.Q. REv. 532 (1934).
24 Woodward argued that the buyer may have repudiated only because
he thought he could not receive complete performance from the seller because
the contract did not conform to the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
He therefore suggested that the buyer should be allowed restitution if the
seller refused an offer to reduce the contract to a writing. F. WooDwARD,
QUASI CONTRACTS § 98, at 155-56 (1913). This suggestion was adopted in the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 355 (4) (1932).
25 2 CORBIN § 325, at 161-62, and cases cited therein.
26 "An action for the purpose of recovering money paid on . .. an oral
executory contract is an action for money had and received, and is in no
sense an action either to enforce a contract for the sale of land or for damages
for breach of contract and is not within the statute of frauds." Woodruff v.
Camp, 101 Ga. App. 124, 125, 112 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1960); accord, Mangione v.
Braverman, 234 Md. 357, 199 A.2d 225 (1964); Sarber v. Harris, 368 P.2d 93
(Okla. 1962).
[Vol. 19
that the plaintiff was a mere volunteer.27 This would be an unsound
result, and would be equally unsound where the plaintiff is in
default. Injustices can be eliminated when it is recognized that to
admit the evidence of the oral contract and the breach is not to en-
force the contract against either party,28 but merely tends to prove
or disprove the ultimate question of whether or not the seller's re-
tention of the buyer's payment is unjust.
The California courts, in denying recovery to the defaulting buyer,
have refused to give substantive effect to the Statute of Frauds.2 9
It has been urged ° that the court adopt the theory established in
those jurisdictions where oral contracts within the purview of the
Statute are made "void,"31 that is, that the buyer has received no
consideration for his payment. This argument has not prevailed.
Although the California Statute makes oral contracts within its scope
"invalid,"3 2 it has been held that these contracts are "voidable"
only.33 From this, the courts have concluded that the seller's prom-
ise is good consideration for the buyer's payment.34
Effect of the Vendee's Default and ihe Seller's Innocence
Once it has been determined that the Statute of Frauds should be
given no substantive effect, the courts have concerned themselves
with the effect of the buyer's default. Recovery is denied in most
instances on the ground that a party in default should not prevail
against an innocent party.3 5 This traditional view has been stated
as follows:
The right in the vendee of land by verbal contract, to recover what
money or other consideration he has paid, is clearly confined to those
27 Jeanblanc 935; see RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTION § 2 (1937).
28 Grauel v. Rohe, 185 Md. 121, 125, 43 A.2d 201, 203 (1945); Roberts v.
Roesch, 306 Pa. 435, 440, 159 A. 870, 871 (1932).
29 Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471 (1901); Walbridge v. Rich-
ards, 212 Cal. 408, 298 P. 971 (1931); Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal. App. 2d
432, 150 P.2d 509 (1944).
30 Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal. App. 2d 432, 438, 150 P.2d 509, 512
(1944).
31 Cases cited note 12 supra.
32 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624.
83 Harper v. Goldschmidt, 156 Cal. 245, 104 P. 451 (1909); Producer's
Fruit Co. v. Goddard, 75 Cal. App. 737, 243 P. 686 (1925).
34 Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 393, 66 P. 471 (1901); see Thompson
v. Schurman, 65 Cal. App. 2d 432, 438, 150 P.2d 509, 512 (1944).
35 "Under these circumstances, I think it would be quite monstrous if
the plaintiff could recover, and I am glad to think that the authorities are all
opposed to her claim." Mellor, J., in Thomas v. Brown, 1 Q.B.D. 714, 723
(1876); accord, Schweiter v. Halsey, 57 Wash. 2d 707, 359 P.2d 821 (1961);
Bruni v. Andre, 339 Mass. 708, 162 N.E.2d 52 (1959); Burford v. Bridwell,
199 Okla. 245, 185 P.2d 216 (1947); Watkins v. Wells, 303 Ky. 728, 198 S.W.2d
662 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 307 Ky. 449, 211 S.W.2d 410 (1948); Camp-
bell v. Fair, 82 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Keystone Hardware Corp.
v. Tague, 246 N.Y. 79, 158 N.E. 27 (1927); Purves v. Martin, 122 Me. 73, 118
A. 892 (1922); Sennett v. Shehan, 27 Minn. 328, 7 N.W. 266 (1880); Lingle
v. Clemens, 17 Ind. 124 (1861); Crabtree v. Welles, 19 Ill. 55 (1855); Coughlin
v. Knowles, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 57 (1843); Lane v. Shackford, 5 N.H. 130 (1830);
Abbott v. Draper, 4 Denio 51 (N.Y. 1830); Shaw v. Shaw, 6 Vt. 69 (1834).
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cases where the vendor has refused or become unable to carry out
the contract, the plaintiff himself having faithfully performed or
offered to perform on his part.36
Stating the question in terms of the restitutionary model, that is,
whether or not the vendor is unjustly retaining a benefit conferred
upon him by the vendee, it seems sound to conclude that the vendor's
retention is not usually considered unjust if the vendee is in default
and the vendor is not.37
The California courts have accepted this rationale in denying re-
covery.38 In the leading case of Laffey v. Kaufman,39 the vendee
paid $500 down on an oral contract to purchase realty and subse-
quently demanded repayment. When the vendor refused to repay,
the vendee brought suit. The court held that a demurrer to the
complaint should have been sustained because the plaintiff had
failed to allege faithful performance on his part and a breach by
the vendor.40 Judging from this case, one would be led to believe that
a defaulting plaintiff in an unenforceable contract case could never
recover his payment in California. The validity of this statement
will be discussed in the conclusion of the note.41
Possible Imposition of a Forfeiture
If the buyer is denied relief merely because he is in default, it is
clear that in some cases he may be subjected to a forfeiture; that
is, the seller may be allowed to terminate the buyer's rights under
the contract and retain the payments without regard to the amount
of damage he has sustained. The possibility that a forfeiture may
be imposed has been given little recognition in the unenforceable
contract cases despite the growing body of authority42 granting re-
36 C. BROWNE, A TREATIsE ox THE STATUTE or FRAUDs § 122, at 123-24 (2d
ed. 1863).
37 Jeanblanc 954. Sometimes it is difficult to tell who is in default. In
Lane v. Shackford, 5 N.H. 130 (1830), plaintiff entered into an oral contract
to purchase realty from defendant and made a down payment. Subsequently,
the defendant mortgaged the premises to a third party giving the mortgagee
the power to sell. The plaintiff, upon hearing of this, repudiated the contract
and sued for restitution. Recovery was denied on the ground that the plain-
tiff could not put the vendor in default so long as the latter retained the right
to redeem. Id. at 134.
8 Walbridge v. Richards, 212 Cal. 408, 298 P. 971 (1931); Laffey v.
Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471 (1901); Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal. App.
2d 432, 150 P.2d 509 (1944).
89 134 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471 (1901).
40 Id. at 393, 66 P. at 471. To the same effect, see Walbridge v. Richards,
212 Cal. 408, 298 P. 971 (1931), where the court stated that the issue was
"whether [or not] the plaintiff ... is entitled to recover said sum without
any showing on his part of a further compliance with said oral agreement and
also without any showing by way of either pleading or proof that the defend-
ants have on their part violated any of the terms of said agreement." Id. at
413, 298 P. at 973-74. See also Leach v. Rowley, 138 Cal. 709, 72 P. 403 (1903).
41 As will be discussed below, it is believed that under present California
law a defaulting plaintiff under an oral contract within the Statute of Frauds
can recover his down payment to the extent that to deny recovery would sub-
ject him to a forfeiture. See text accompanying notes 80-93 infra.
42 See e.g., Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951);
De Leon v. Aldrete, 398 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). Cases are col-
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Jief against forfeitures in cases involving enforceable contracts.
Application of the Rule Denying Restitution
Where Vendor Waives Vendee's Breach
It is fundamental that once a party commits an anticipatory
breach of contract by repudiation, the other party has two alterna-
tives: he may either terminate the defaulting party's rights under
the contract, or he may waive the breach and seek further perform-
ance.43 The same alternatives are open to a vendor under an oral
contract within the Statute of Frauds when the vendee repudiates
after making a down payment.44 In many cases, the vendor alleges
not only that he was ready and willing to perform at the time the
vendee repudiated, but that he still remains so.45 That is to say,
the vendor has waived the vendee's breach. It can be stated cate-
gorically that if the contract were written, the vendee could not
recover his down payment in cases where the vendor had waived the
breach, for to allow recovery would defeat the vendor's right to spe-
cific performance.40 Professor Corbin has noted that the vendee
should not be in any better position merely because the contract is
unenforceable. 47
Recovery has traditionally been denied in this situation merely
because the buyer is in default.48 However, the present trend of
allowing recovery where a forfeiture would otherwise result49 indi-
cates that the buyer's default cannot be the crucial factor in all juris-
dictions. It must therefore be asked whether or not the vendee would
be subjected to a forfeiture where the vendor waives the vendee's
breach and seeks further performance. Merely stating this crucial
question seems to answer it, for it is difficult to see how the vendee
can claim imposition of a forfeiture when the vendor still wishes to
perform. 0 The vendor is not seeking to retain the down payment
lected in Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8 (1953); see Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting
Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE L.J. 1013 (1931).
43 L. SnvpsoN, CONTRACTS § 171 (2d ed. 1965). In fact the vendor does
have another alternative: he may rescind the contract and restore to the
vendee all payments made. Id. Judging from the volume of cases where the
vendee seeks to recover his payments, it would seem that this alternative is
rarely elected.
44 Since the oral contract is perfectly valid until the Statute of Frauds is
pleaded as a defense to a suit on the contract, it follows that the same rules
concerning election of remedies followed in enforceable contract cases would
apply. Cf. Keystone Hardware Corp. v. Tague, 246 N.Y. 79, 158 N.E. 27 (1927);
Laffey v. Kaufman, 136 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471 (1901).
45 Campbell v. Fair, 82 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Keystone
Hardware Corp. v. Tague, 246 N.Y. 79, 158 N.E. 27 (1927); Cook v. Griffith,
76 W. Va. 799, 86 S.E. 879 (1915); Laffey v. Kaufman, 136 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471
(1901); Gammon v. Butler, 48 Me. 344 (1861); Coughlin v. Knowles, 48 Mass.
(7 Met.) 57 (1843).
40 Corbin, supra note 42, at 1016-18.
47 2 CoaaNm § 332, at 180. See also 3 WnusToN § 538, at 842-43.
48 See text accompanying notes 35-41 supra.
49 See authorities cited note 42 supra.
50 Cf. Corbin, supra note 42, at 1016-18; Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 8, 10 (1953).
While these authorities deal with enforceable contracts, it is believed that the
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and the land as well. Quite the contrary; he still wishes to convey
the realty, and states that he will do so upon tender of the balance
of the purchase price. Allowing the vendor to retain the down pay-
ment under these circumstances is not unjust, but an injustice would
result if the vendee were allowed to recover.51 If the contract had
been enforceable, recovery would have been refused in order not to
destroy the vendor's right to specific performance.52 Admittedly,
the vendor in the oral contract situation has no right to specific per-
formance, but this does not mean that he should not be afforded
every opportunity to have the performance for which he bargained.
Denying recovery to the defaulting buyer encourages performance,
for one is more likely to carry out his promise once told that re-
covery of his down payment will be disallowed. Thus, a denial of
recovery to the defaulting buyer in cases where the vendor waives
the breach can be justified even in those jurisdictions which grant
relief against forfeitures, not because the complaining party is in
default, but because there is simply no forfeiture against which to
grant relief.
Where Vendor Terminates Vendee's Rights
When the buyer repudiates the contract and demands the return
of the money he has paid, the seller need not waive the breach; he
may immediately terminate the buyer's rights under the contract. 3
Cases involving this situation deserve separate consideration, for
here the seller's retention of the buyer's payments could be consid-
ered unjust.
In the North Carolina case of Durham Consolidated Land & Im-
provement Co. v. Guthrie,54 a vendee sought recovery of his down
payment after defaulting on an oral contract to purchase realty.
After the vendee's repudiation the vendor sold the property to a third
party. It was held that the subsequent sale did not alter the vendee's
rights, and recovery was denied.5 5 Similarly, in the Arkansas case of
Sturgis v. Meadors5 6 a vendor brought suit on a check given by the
buyer as part payment under an oral contract to purchase realty.
The buyer breached by stopping payment on the check 2 or 3 days
after entering into the contract, but on the date set for completion
principles stated therein can be applied to unenforceable contracts as well.
See text accompanying notes 61-67 infra.51 Such an unjust result has been reached in those cases where the vendee
is allowed to recover because the Statute of Frauds uses the term "void" not-
withstanding the vendor's willingness to continue the contract. Examples are:
Reedy v. Ebsen, 60 S.D. 1, 242 N.W. 592 (1932), afi'd on rehearing, 61 S.D. 54,
245 N.W. 908 (1932); Brown v. Pollard, 89 Va. 696, 17 S.E. 6 (1893). Prior to
the case of Stuesser v. Ebel, 19 Wis. 2d 591, 120 N.W.2d 679 (1963), the Wis-
consin vendor could not even retain his expenses when the vendee sued to
recover the down payment. Note, 1964 Wis. L. REv. 167.
52 Corbin, supra note 42, at 1018 n.7; cf. Goldsworthy v. Dobbins, 110 Cal.
App. 2d 802, 243 P.2d 883 (1952).
53 L. SImPsoN, CONTRACTS § 171 (2d ed. 1965).
54 116 N.C. 381, 21 S.E. 952 (1895).
55 Id. at 385, 21 S.E. at 954.
56 223 Ark. 359, 266 S.W.2d 81 (1954), noted in 1955 WAsa L.Q. 203, and
12 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 124 (1955).
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of performance by both parties, the seller lacked good title to convey.
The court nevertheless held for the seller, pointing out that once the
buyer had repudiated, the seller was not required to do a futile
act in perfecting his title.57  Durham and Sturgis, in effect, held
that the vendor may terminate the buyer's rights under the con-
tract upon the latter's repudiation and retain both the land and the
money without recourse by the vendee.58
It should be recognized that in terms of a possible forfeiture, the
situation where the seller terminates the buyer's rights differs radi-
cally from the case where the seller waives the buyer's breach. In the
latter situation, as was noted above,59 recovery should be denied
because the seller should be given every opportunity to receive the
performance for which he bargained. However, where the vendor
terminates the vendee's rights it is clear that he has given up all
thoughts of further performance and seeks to retain the down pay-
ment as forfeited. In jurisdictions that grant relief against forfei-
tures, this situation should be distinguished from the waiver situa-
tion and the court should ascertain whether or not the down pay-
ment exceeds the damage sustained by the vendor due to the
breach.60 If it is found that the seller has suffered less injury than
the amount of the buyer's payment, retention of the excess should
be considered unjust and recovery thereof allowed.
Analogy to ihe Enforceable Coniract Situaiion
In an article dealing with the defaulting buyer's restitutionary
rights where the contract is enforceable,6 ' Professor Corbin has
pointed out that recovery should be allowed unless: (1) the vendor
has not rescinded and remains ready and willing to perform, and
still has the right to specific performance; 62 or (2) the vendee cannot
57 223 Ark, at 363, 266 S.W.2d at 83.
58 Accord, Rosenberg v. Dietrick, 37 F. Supp. 700 (D. Mass. 1940); Lauer
v. Raker, 128 Ind. App. 264, 146 N.E.2d 116 (1957); Knight v. Carter, 1 Misc.
2d 351, 146 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Bernstein v. Rosenzweig, 1 N.J.
Super. 48, 62 A.2d 147 (Super. Ct. 1948) (dictum). It is interesting to note
how flexible the term "ready and willing to perform" is. While it should
refer to the readiness of the vendor to perform at the time of trial, indicating
his waiver of the vendee's breach, it has been permitted to refer to the date
set by the parties for performance. Triplett v. Knight, 309 Ky. 349, 217
S.W.2d 802 (1949); Watkins v. Wells, 303 Ky. 728, 198 S.W2.d 662 (1946), rev'd
on other grounds, 307 Ky. 449, 211 S.W.2d 410 (1948). This position results
in allowing the vendor to retain the payments even though he has terminated
the vendee's rights and is no longer "ready and willing to perform."
59 Text accompanying notes 48-52 supra.60 "What is the correct measure of damages in a case of this kind? Shall
we apply the rule of compensatory damages, or is it a case in which punitive
damages should be allowed?" Malmberg v. Baugh, 62 Utah 331, 340, 218 P.
975, 978 (1923) (enforceable contract).
61 Corbin, supra note 42.
62 Since neither party has the right to specific performance when the
contract is oral and within the Statute of Frauds, this statement could be
construed to imply that Professor Corbin would allow restitution to the de-
faulting vendee regardless of whether the vendor waived the vendee's breach,
or terminated his rights under the contract. Such construction is not war-
ranted, however, for Corbin has stated in his treatise that a defaulting buyer
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show that his installments exceed the damage caused to the seller by
the repudiation; or (3) there is an express liquidated damages pro-
vision which can be upheld as such and which is not merely a for-
feiture or penalty provision.6 3 Thus, where the contract is enforce-
able, Corbin has distinguished between cases where the vendor has
waived the breach and cases where he has terminated the vendee's
rights. It is submitted that these considerations are also pertinent to
cases involving unenforceable contracts. The single element that
distinguishes the oral contract apart from the written one is, of
course, the Statute of Frauds which merely provides that the con-
tract cannot be enforced against either party. But, as has already
been pointed out,64 the buyer's suit is not upon the contract which
he has repudiated, but is based on a claim for restitution of the un-justly retained benefits conferred upon the seller. The nature of the
buyer's suit is the same as where the contract is written,65 and the
restitutionary remedy afforded in the written contract cases is in
no way predicated upon the fact that the contract is enforceable.
Indeed, the contract as to the defaulting plaintiff is no longer en-
forceable, for once he has repudiated he loses his right to sue upon
it; 66 yet, he is nevertheless allowed restitution. Legal scholars have
therefore concluded 67 that the quasi-contractual rights of a defaulting
vendee in the unenforceable contract situation should be the same
as if the contract were written and enforceable.
Recognition of a Possible Forfeiture
The fact that the vendee may be subjected to a forfeiture if the
seller is allowed to keep the payments without regard to his injury
in an unenforceable contract case should have the same rights as if the
contract had been written. 2 CoRBim § 332, at 180.
63 Few unenforceable contract cases have been found where there was
an express provision that the seller should retain all of the buyer's payments
should the buyer default. There was such a provision in Lanham v. Rei-
mann, 177 Ore. 193, 160 P.2d 318 (1945). In absence of an express liquidated
damages provision, it has been said that "the obvious intent of the parties to
the contract is that all payments made by the purchaser are to be treated
simply and only as payments on the purchase price." De Leon v. Aldrete,
398 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (enforceable contract).
64 Text accompanying notes 21-28 supra.
65 See Branche v. Hetzel, 241 Cal. App. 2d 801, 51 Cal. Rptr. 188 (1966);
Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
66 See Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 801, 415 P.2d
833, 52 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1966); Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d
629 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 280 (1932). But see Ward v. Union
Bond & Trust Co., 243 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1957) (applying California law).
In Ward the vendee was allowed specific performance of a contract for the
sale of land even though he had willfully breached the contract and had his
rights under it terminated by the vendor. This was apparently disapproved
in Honey v. Henry's Franchise Leasing Corp., supra, where the court said:
'"When a vendee has materially breached his contract, the vendor has an
election to rescind or to enforce the contract [citations omitted]. The de-
faulting vendee, however, has no such election. Otherwise, the contract of
sale would in effect be a lease with an option to purchase." 64 Cal. 2d at
804, 415 P.2d at 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
67 3 WILLISTON § 538, at 842-43, 2 CoRan § 332, at 180; RESTATEnEmT OF
CONTRACTS § 355 (1932). See also Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc., 32 F. Supp.
477 (D. Conn. 1940).
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has not gone unnoticed in all jurisdictions.6 There was at one time
some indication that the Wisconsin court would decide the problem
using the forfeiture approach. In Schwartz v. Syver69 a defaulting
vendee sued to recover a down payment made under a contract for
the sale of land. It was alleged that the memorandum covering the
sale did not meet the formal requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
Although the court held that the Statute's formalities were satis-
fied 7 0 it went on to say by dictum that in cases where there was no
writing the vendee could recover that portion of the payments which
exceeded the damage sustained by the seller due to the breach,7 1 thus
recognizing that a forfeiture might occur and should be relieved
against in unenforceable contract cases. This theory, however, was
directly contrary to an earlier line of Wisconsin cases, 72 which al-
lowed the defaulting vendee to recover on the theory that the oral
contract was a complete nullity due to the use of the word "void" in
the Wisconsin Statute of Frauds.73 In Stuesser v. Ebe 4 the court
returned to the earlier approach and the dictum in the Schwartz case
was expressly overruled. The rationale of the Schwartz case, while
perhaps unacceptable in jurisdictions which give substantive effect
to the Statute of Frauds, such as Wisconsin, should be followed
where the Statute is not given substantive effect.
The Idaho Supreme Court has accepted the forfeiture approach.75
In Raff v. Baird76 the plaintiff orally contracted to purchase realty
from the defendant, and in lieu of a cash down payment, furnished.
labor and materials for construction on the land that was to be pur-
chased. The plaintiff buyer subsequently repudiated and the defend-
ant sold the land to a third party for the same price that he
would have received had the oral contract with the plaintiff been
performed. In reversing the trial court's decision which nonsuited
the buyer, the court stated:
The question of forfeiture is not... the question whether a vendee
by his own default can confer upon himself a cause of action for the
return of money paid, 'the other party being ready and willing to
perform his part of the contract,' but whether on default by the
vendee occurring the vendor may by abandoning all idea of perform-
ance . . . become entitled to retain not only the land but also the
money paid, without regard to the damages or want of damages
sustained from the breach . . . .77
The court recognized the analogy between the unenforceable and en-
forceable contract situations, supporting their decision by reference
68 Raff v. Baird, 76 Idaho 422, 283 P.2d 927 (1955); Schwartz v. Syver,
264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W.2d 489 (1953) (dictum).
69 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W.2d 489 (1953).
70 Id. at 528-29, 59 N.W.2d at 491.
71 Id. at 531-33, 59 N.W.2d at 492-93.
72 Durkin v. Machesky, 177 Wis. 595, 188 N.W. 97 (1922); Brandeis v.
Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 142 (1860).
73 See discussion of this theory in text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
See also Note, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 167.
74 19 Wis. 2d 591, 120 N.W.2d 679 (1963), noted in 1964 Wis. L. REV. 167.
75 Raff v. Baird, 76 Idaho 422, 283 P.2d 927 (1955).
76 76 Idaho 422, 283 P.2d 927 (1955).
77 Id. at 427, 283 P.2d at 930. The court was quoting from Annot., 31
A.L.R.2d 8, 9-10 (1953).
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to a case78 dealing with an enforceable contract. It is believed that
the Raff case reached the equitable and logical result and should be
followed.79
California
California is among the jurisdictions that grant restitution to a
defaulting buyer in the enforceable contract situation to the extent
that a denial of relief would impose a forfeiture upon the buyer.8 0 In
Freedman v. The Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Matthias Parish
of Los Angeles,"' the California Supreme Court had before it a will-
fully defaulting vendee under a written contract to purchase realty.
The vendee had paid $2,000 down before he repudiated the contract.
Following this repudiation the vendor terminated the vendee's
rights under the contract and sold to a third party for a greater price
than he would have received had the contract with the plaintiff been
performed. In allowing restitution, the court discussed several pro-
visions of the California Civil Code.
Section 327582 of the Civil Code provides that if a party incurs a
forfeiture by reason of his breach, relief against such forfeiture should
be granted so long as the defendant's breach is neither grossly negli-
gent, willful nor fraudulent. Since the vendee's breach in the Freed-
man case was found to be willful, 83 section 3275 was inapplicable.
The court, however, found an alternative basis for recovery. It rea-
soned that to allow the vendor to terminate the vendee's rights
under the contract and retain all the buyer's payments without re-
gard to the damage occasioned by the breach would be an imposition
of punitive damages on the buyer in a case arising out of contract,8 4
a result in contravention of section 329485 of the Civil Code.
78 Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954).
79 In Lewis v. Peterson, 127 Mont. 474, 267 P.2d 127 (1954), recovery was
allowed to a defaulting vendee under an oral contract to purchase realty, but
that case is unique. It was found that at the time of entering into the oral
contract, the plaintiff was suffering from severe mental strain. He had not
only just seen his wife burn to death, he also had been struck by lightning,
hit by an 8,000 gallon gas tank (which also smashed his combine), lost 25
head of cattle in a storm and had "got hailed out." He was subsequently
declared a mental incompetent. Holding that he had set forth facts which
appealed to the conscience of a court of equity, recovery of the down payment
was allowed, less damage sustained by the vendor. Id. at 478-79, 267 P.2d at
129.
80 Freedman v. The Rector, 37 Cal. 2d 16, 230 P.2d 629 (1951).
81 Id.
82 "Whenever, by the terms of an obligation, a party thereto incurs a
forfeiture, or a loss in the nature of a forfeiture, by reason of his failure to
comply with its provisions, he may be relieved therefrom, upon making full
compensation to the other party, except in case of a grossly negligent, willful,
or fraudulent breach of duty."
83 37 Cal. 2d at 20, 230 P.2d at 631.
84 Id. at 21, 230 P.2d at 632.
85 "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,
where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, express
or implied, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover dam-
ages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant."
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Further, section 3369(1)"" of the Civil Code prohibits the court
from granting specific relief where a forfeiture would be imposed.
Thus, the California courts have held that a seller cannot bring a suit
to quiet title without offering to restore to the buyer any payments
in excess of the seller's damage.87  If relief was to be denied when
the buyer brought suit, the right to restitution would depend on
whether it was the seller or the buyer who brought suit, an anomalous
result which the Freedman court refused to accept. 88 Freedman
therefore allowed a willfully defaulting buyer restitution of his pay-
ments to the extent that a forfeiture would have been imposed had
recovery been denied.
The rationale of the Freedman case is equally applicable where
the contract is oral.8 9 The language in the statutes relied on by the
Freedman court in no way eliminates unenforceable contracts from
their scope, and the forfeiture is just as real whether the contract is
written or oral. It can therefore be concluded that if, in an unen-
forceable contract case, the defaulting buyer's breach is neither
grossly negligent, willful nor fraudulent, relief against forfeiture
could be granted by virtue of section 3275 of the Civil Code; if the
breach is such that relief under section 3275 cannot be granted, the
principles of the Freedman case should control.
There have been no California cases subsequent to Freedman
directly on the point90 of the defaulting buyer's restitutionary rights
under an unenforceable contract for the sale of land. As has already
been pointed out,91 the California courts have repeatedly refused to
86 "Neither specific nor preventive relief can be granted to enforce a
penalty or forfeiture in any case, nor to enforce a penal law, except in a case
of nuisance or unfair competition."
87 Behrendt v. Abraham, 64 Cal. 2d 182, 410 P.2d 828, 49 Cal. Rptr. 292
(1966); Baffa v. Johnson, 35 Cal. 2d 36, 216 P.2d 13 (1950); Barkis v. Scott,
34 Cal. 2d 116, 208 P.2d 367 (1949).
88 37 Cal. 2d at 22, 230 P.2d at 632-33.
89 Accord, Raff v. Baird, 76 Idaho 422, 283 P.2d 927 (1955), where the
Idaho court relied on a case involving forfeiture in an enforceable contract
case to support relief against forfeiture in an unenforceable contract case.
90 There has been some strong and misleading dicta, however. In Noel
v. Dumont Builders, Inc., 178 Cal. App. 2d 691, 3 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1960), the
court quoted with complete approval the statement in Laffey v. Kaufman,
136 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471 (1901), that before a plaintiff can recover his down
payment, he must show at least a tender of performance on his part and a
breach by the defendant. The Noel case did not present an issue of for-
feiture, but the language referred to is misleading, for it implies that the de-
faulting plaintiff can, in no case, recover his payments.
In Maddox v. Rainoldi 163 Cal. App. 2d 384, 329 P.2d 599 (1958), the
plaintiff sought a decree that the defendant held property on an oral trust
for the plaintiff. Alternatively, he asked reimbursement for improvements
made on the property to which the defendant raised the statute of limitations
as a defense. It was held that no cause of action accrued until the oral trust
was breached. The court added: "It seems logical to hold that until the
repudiation of the oral promise, or its breach in some other fashion, the law
imposes no such implied promise to repay. Such is the rule in the case of
actions to recover money paid the vendor under oral contracts to convey real
property." Id. at 392, 329 P.2d at 604-05 (emphasis added); accord, Rooney v.
Sullivan, 169 Cal. App. 2d 432, 434-35, 337 P.2d 543, 544 (1959).
91 See text accompanying notes 38-41 supra.
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allow any recovery to the defaulting buyer,92 but this was based on
the law prior to Freedman that automatically denied a defaulting
party recovery against a party innocent of any breach 3 The Freed-
man case will make it incumbent upon the court to restate the rule
when the proper case arises, for, due to the stated policy against for-
feitures, no longer is the fact that the plaintiff is in default deter-
minative of his right to restitution in California.
Ronald A. Norman*
92 Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 66 P. 471 (1901); Walbridge v. Rich-
ards, 212 Cal. 408, 298 P. 971 (1931); Thompson v. Schurman, 65 Cal. App. 2d
432, 150 P.2d 509 (1944).
93 Laffey v. Kaufman, 134 Cal. 391, 393, 66 P. 471 (1901); Walbridge v.
Richards, 212 Cal. 408, 414, 298 P. 971, 974 (1931); Thompson v. Schurman, 65
Cal. App. 2d 432, 438, 150 P.2d 509, 512 (1944). However, the result in these
cases cannot be challenged because the vendor in each instance had alleged
that he was still ready and willing to perform at the time of trial. Thus, no
question of forfeiture was involved. See text accompanying notes 43-53
supra.
* Member, Third Year Class.
